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Abstract: A modern Emergency Response Vehicle (ERV) is a combination of emergency services and functional mobile 
office on the wheels. Researchers have observed that emergency response personnel including Law 
Enforcement Authorities (LEAs), Police and border guards, could be on the duty while having possibility to 
use same services compared to fixed office. During our research study, users have registered special demand 
for mobile office. To meet this demand, designers and engineers have combined a modern vehicle platform 
with computers, monitors, wireless connectivity and many other devices needed in everyday activities. 
However, there is continue challenge, the standards are not covering information and cyber security properly. 
This research paper fulfils that gap by applying the Finnish National Security Auditing Criteria version 2 
(KATAKRI II) on eight asset classes that have recognised in Mobile Object Bus Integration (MOBI) project. 
The outcome is a pragmatic solution that provides large set of safeguards for guaranteeing ERV information 
and cyber security. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Law enforcement authorities (LEA), including police 
officers and border guards, are spending significant 
of their day-to-day service time on the road. This 
situation is demanding and their vehicles need to offer 
same facilities compared to working in the office. To 
meet this requirement, a modern emergency response 
vehicle (ERV) is converted as an office on the wheels, 
technically known as the mobile office. It is evident 
that the mobile office has to meet high requirements 
for data confidentially, integrity and availability 
(CIA). 
Currently, commercial vehicles are converted to 
ERVs. Therefore, a common approach to reach CIA 
requirement is to handle a commercial vehicle as a 
vehicle platform and modify such vehicle platform as 
per the LEA needs (Rajamäki, 2013). The vehicle 
platforms are equipped with computers, monitors and 
many other additional electronic devices. Many 
researchers have reported that the standardization of 
ERVs is very fragmented. In addition, many 
associations have released the standards of their own 
(Rajamäki, 2013; NFPA, 2016; FAMA, 2016). The 
current standards are focusing on mainly safety, 
performance and testing. On the other hand, 
information and cyber security is usually out of the 
scope. The new demands of ICT systems and 
evolving threat vectors requires specific security 
solution to address these issues. 
The main purpose of this study is to propose the 
novel solution for ERV information and cyber 
security safeguards by applying environment and 
technology independent Finnish National Security 
Auditing Criteria known as the KATAKRI (an 
acronym in Finnish language). The proposal covers 
safeguards for vehicle preparedness, vehicle 
equipment, vehicle interior design, integrated ICT- 
and communications systems and power supply 
system.  
The paper is structured as follow: section 2 
recognizes the research gap, missing cybersecurity 
guidelines for ERVs, and makes review for existing 
ERV standards, automotive standards and research 
activities. In section 3 we present our research 
approach and methodologies. Section 4 introduces a 
case study; how a van sized ERV can be seen as 
protectable asset. In section 5 we propose a practical 
solution that fulfils the research gap; we propose a set 
cybersecurity safeguards for ERVs. The last section,   
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 discusses about strengths, weaknesses and scalability 
of proposed solution. 
2 CURRENT STATE OF THE 
ART AND RESEARCH GAP 
The study started with literature review to find-out 
how current ERVs and automobile industry are 
addressing the information and cyber security related 
standardization? The current-state-of-the-art also 
reveals other aspects of ERVs; how researchers are 
seeing modern automobile as protectable asset?  
2.1 ERV Standards 
There are few forefront European and International 
standards on building emergency vehicles. The series 
of European Standards EN 1846-x focuses on three 
areas of firefighting and rescue service vehicle: (1) 
Nomenclature and designation, (2) Common 
requirements - safety and performance, and (3) 
Permanently installed equipment – safety and 
performance (EC Cen EN 1846-2, 2009; EC Cen EN 
1846-3, 2008; EC Cen EN 1846-1, 2011).   
On the contrary, the US ambulance manufacturing 
division (AMD) of the National Truck Equipment 
Association released Ambulance Standards in year 
2007. In 2014, the American Society of Automotive 
Engineers also released updated and more advance set 
of recommendations for ambulances and its safety 
standards. These recommendation is cumulative 
iteration and updates on KKK-A1822 document by 
General Service Administration. Researchers have 
often argued and questioned the KKK-A1822 for its 
outdated recommendation not meeting modern 
requirements. Our study demonstrated – European 
and American ERV standards are lacking structured 
recommendation for information and cyber security. 
The most widely accepted and admired standards 
for building emergency vehicles came from an 
international non-profit organization, namely The 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 
have released a set of standards on fire and rescue 
services, products and solutions. NFPA 414: Standard 
for Aircraft Rescue and Fire-Fighting Vehicles and 
NFPA 1917: Standard for Automotive Ambulances is 
closely related to the Emergency Response Vehicle. 
NFPA 414 revolves around the design, performance 
and acceptance criteria for rescue and fire-fighting 
vehicles. NFPA 1917 defines the design, performance 
and testing requirements for ambulances. These 
standards  have  specified  targets such as aircraft vehi- 
cles and medical emergency ambulances.  
There are two more NFPA standards which 
address education and training requirements for 
Emergency Vehicles: NFPA 1071: Standard for 
Emergency Vehicle Technician Professional 
Qualifications and NFPA 1451: Standard for a Fire 
and Emergency Services Vehicle Operations Training 
Program. NFPA has considered international and US 
Federal Specifications when developing these 
standards. However, NFPA does not offer any 
guidelines how to cover information and cyber 
security when designing or testing ERV's. 
The Fire Apparatus Manufacturers’ 
Association (FAMA) is another non-profit trade 
association which provides some guidelines for 
emergency response vehicles. However, FAMA has 
not released any public guidelines on how to build an 
emergency response vehicle. Another similar work 
found in the literature is from the Ministry of Health 
and Long-term Care of Ontario, Canada. They have 
released standards for the minimum acceptance 
requirements for land ambulances. A diverse range of 
studies have been done on various specific areas of 
emergency vehicles including the dispatching system 
(Han-tao et al., 2009) the intelligent navigation 
system (Salehinejad et al., 2011) the vehicle location 
finder (Alsalloum and Rand, 2006), the safety and 
security of onboard personnel and customers (Perry 
and Lindell, 2003), communication systems (Chen, 
2010) and others. 
2.2 Automotive Standards 
Research study also suggests that automotive 
standards are not widely covering information and 
cyber security. Society of Automotive Engineers 
(SAE) has released a few standards for covering 
electric vehicles and diagnostics interface; SAE 
J2186_200506: E/E Data Link Security, 
J1939/73_20130: Application Layer – Diagnostics 
and SAE J2931/1_201412: Digital Communications 
for Plug-in Electric Vehicles. In nutshell, current 
situation is not able to define automotive information 
and cyber security systematically. Again, the 
practices are very fragmented and seeks more 
targeted solution. 
Recently, Society of Automotive Engineers 
(SAE) has put their effort and work towards 
information and cyber security. They released their 
guidelines, SAE J3061: Cybersecurity Guidebook for 
Cyber-Physical Automotive Systems, in 2016. Their 
approach is to find out if the existing concepts and 
methods could be applied in automotive industry. The 
demand to cover holistic automotive cyber security 
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 created an opportunity for the Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers and the Association of Global 
Automakers to found Automotive Information and 
Sharing Center (Auto-ISAC). Auto-ISAC combines 
work forces of auto manufacturers, standardization, 
other industry and academia to find out the best 
possible solution regarding automotive cyber security 
(Auto alliance, 2015). 
2.3 Research and Innovation Activities 
Academic researchers have also put significant effort 
for automotive cyber security. Their focus is to handle 
the combination of the vehicles and ICT as cyber 
physical systems (Fallah and Sengupta, 2012; 
McMillen and Sinha, 2010). Their research target is 
to find out possible physical threats caused via ICT 
instead of applying existing information and cyber 
security frameworks in automotive ecosystem. 
Petit et al., (2015) are presenting analysis for 
potential risks for automated vehicles without any 
standardised safeguards against potential threats. 
They are using Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) to find out the most remarkable risks 
regarding automated vehicles. Their research work 
reveals many unseen trends. According to their 
research the Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS) will be the most vulnerable part of the 
automated vehicle ecosystem, the observation 
previously omitted by researchers. Famous hacking 
conferences, like Def Con and Black Hat, are also 
interested to share the latest findings regarding 
automobiles and especially trendy cars. In 2013, 
Hackers revealed the first vulnerabilities in Def Con 
21 when they could control the car remotely 
(Rosenblath, 2013). After Def Con 21 car hacking has 
been permanently in the conference schedule. 
3 RESEARCH APPROACH AND 
METHODOLOGIES 
This study focuses on developing a pragmatic 
information and cyber security solutions for ERVs. 
The research approach and methodologies are also 
reflecting the solution oriented target. This research 
study is aiming to develop a systematic information 
and cyber security framework for ERVs using 
inductive reasoning scientific method considering 
specific analytic reasoning process. The method is 
strongly based on providing solutions. The analytic 
reasoning method draws the premises from unknown 
to known with iterative process that develops 
confidence in achieved solutions and hence ensures 
the trust. In this method, the goal of analyst is to reach 
a judgement about an issue or problem. The outcome 
of analyses presents the tangible results in the form of 
a product (Cook and Thomas, 2005). 
The process starts with planning of proving 
solutions to given issues. The planning phase includes 
resource usage and timeline plan. The second step in 
the process includes gathering and familiarizing with 
available information on top of the already gathered 
information. Next, the analyst hypotheses and 
outlines multiple candidates with explanations. 
Indeed, analyst aiming to reach a judgement by 
evaluating alternative explanations. The whole 
process allows to expand and broaden understanding 
of analyst’s previous thinking. The final step allows 
analyst to summarize the judgement with creation of 
reports, documents and products. The inductive 
reasoning method starts with the specific 
observations and measures that allows to detect 
patterns and regularities, and resulting into formulate 
some tentative hypotheses to explore. Finally, the 
explorations of hypothesis end with broader 
generalizations, developing conclusions or drawing 
model. In general, this research method is an 
ongoing-iterative and highly collaborative process 
where people, process and technology synchronously 
scale to support cyber security reasoning, assessment 
and actions to implement safeguards in ERVs. 
4 A CASE STUDY – VAN SIZED 
ERV 
Typically, ERVs are built on the top of the 
commercial vehicle platforms (Rajamäki, 2013). The 
type or model of the platform is selected according to 
purpose and need. There are several options available 
on the market including sedan, wagon, van or truck. 
In this study, we have taken a case of a van sized 
ERVs.  
The interior space of the van sized vehicle can be 
modified and tailored according to customer need. In 
our previous studies, we have piloted new approach 
with Finnish Police (Rajamäki, 2013; Rajamäki and 
Rathod, 2013). The Finnish Police has divided 
interior space in three compartments; (1) Vehicle 
Control (or) Driver’s Space (or) Cabin (2) Mobile 
Office Space, and (3) Transport Space. 
The driver space is reserved for the driver and his 
pair. It contains all vehicle control related features 
like steering, gear control and break control. 
Additionally, there could be installed equipment that 
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 is used in everyday activities; onboard computer, 
touch screen display, keyboard, mouse, voice 
communications equipment and extra batteries for 
mission critical systems. The second compartment, 
mobile office space, acts like an office and it is 
designed to offer facilities for bigger operations when 
the vehicle is parked and stabilized. It contains seats, 
table, storage for equipment, printer and touch screen 
display. The third compartment, transport space, is 
reserved for prison or equipment transportation. It has 
bench and locker. Following Figure-1 presents ERV’s 
integrated system components: 
 
 
Figure 1: ERV compartments and equipment integration. 
For example, Figure 1 demonstrates (A) dedicated 
start-up battery, (B) dedicated battery for equipment, 
(C) inverter/charger with possibility for external 
charging, (D) standby main unit for manual 
equipment control & intelligent power management, 
(E) on-board computer, (F) standby control panel/ 
display and (G) touch screen display, (H) keyboard, 
(I) mouse, (J) voice communication equipment and 
(K) data connection equipment. 
4.1 Protectable Assets 
The ERV design process is highly demanding. The 
rigorous process should be able to cover required 
aspects, including information and cyber security. 
Our previous study focused on user-centric research 
and it produced user requirements specification based 
on the real needs of the Finnish police officers 
(Rathod and Kämppi, 2013). The outcomes of the 
research study have recognized eight main categories 
within ERV assets to be protected, as presented in 
Figure 2, including Emergency Response 
Preparedness, Vehicle Features, Vehicle Equipment, 
Interior Space and Cabin Design, ICT Systems, Data 
Communications, Voice Communications and Power 
Supply Systems. The scope of previous study did not 
cover information and cyber security including 
recognized processes, features, systems and devices. 
The risk and threat vectors have been significantly 
increased since our previous studies. In this study, we 
will use recognized processes, features, systems and 
devices as assets and functional requirements (FR) 
with information and cyber security safeguards.  
 
 
Figure 2: ERV protectable assets categories. 
5 SOLUTION - CYBERSECURITY 
SAFEGUARDS 
In the second phase of the study, we have identified 
appropriate standard for applying cyber security 
safeguards using Finnish National Security Auditing 
Criteria (KATAKRI) for ERVs (Finnish Ministry of 
Defense, 2011). The KATAKRI provides significant 
standardized way to implement cyber security 
auditing criteria and apply relevant safeguards. The 
secure ERVs demands protections of different asset 
classes and components. Following subsection 
explains our proposed solution and outcome of pilot 
case. 
5.1 Emergency Response Preparedness 
The emergency response preparedness functional 
requirement is focusing on making sure the ERV is 
ready on a standby for operation at any time. ERV 
preparedness can be ensured by three different type 
of checks and quick functional auditing; routine 
check, before mission check and after mission check 
(Rathod and Kämppi, 2013). The routine check is 
based on car manufacturers’ recommendation and it 
is made on mileage or time basis. The routine check 
is comparable for any vehicle maintenance program. 
The before mission check is made by vehicle 
embedded diagnosis system and ERV personnel. 
When the ERV is powered on, vehicle embedded 
diagnosis system starts and indicates immediately if 
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 something is wrong. Next, the ERV personnel will go 
through a checklist according to their mission. After 
mission, the ERV personnel will check the vehicle 
again and they will report observed faults (if any) to 
maintenance personnel. 
The regular maintenance program should contain 
procedures for maintaining required information and 
cyber security level. At first place, there should be 
clear policy how the system is documented and how 
the documentation is updated, who has rights to install 
new hardware and software and what criteria must be 
followed in system acceptance process.  All devices, 
software and licenses should be registered to avoid 
situations where expired license or software could 
cause security vulnerabilities. 
To guarantee system confidentially, integrity and 
availability, all new hardware and software need to be 
verified in testbed before integration into real ERV. It 
is also important that ERV configuration changes can 
be made only by authorized personnel. Test accounts 
and test data should be removed when they are not 
needed anymore. As there is need for frequent 
maintenance cycle for engine or brakes, same 
principle should be applied also with ERV ICT-
systems. Software and security updates need to be 
installed in regular basis, systems need to be scanned 
frequently to find out possible vulnerabilities and 
vehicle body need to be checked for tracking or 
espionage devices. After maintenance work systems 
should be locked and vehicle is checked according 
clear desk policy. 
5.2 Vehicle Features 
The features of emergency response and patrol 
vehicles are extremely critical to provide effective 
and timely incident response. Some of the emergency 
vehicle features accelerate the performance and 
increase the safety of personnel (Wang and Shih, 
2013). The list of required features comprises a broad 
range of aspects that are embedded with the vehicle 
platform including car size, sustainable functioning, 
ground clearance and performance of car, vehicle 
type, interior and exterior of vehicles and others. But 
the nature of the car is changed dramatically during 
last decades. A modern car is like data center on the 
wheels and it can contain 50-70 Electronic Control 
Units (ECU) that are responsible for e.g. cruise 
control, navigation and safety systems (Larson and 
Nilsson, 2008). Cars are also connected to background 
systems and it increases possibilities for having 
vulnerabilities via wireless networks. 
KATAKRI does not provide directly any 
safeguards for vehicle specific features. Anyhow, the 
latest research results can be used to complete 
KATAKRI. Larson et al states that connected vehicle 
enables remote software updates for ECUs, same time 
also the number security risks increases (Larson and 
Nilsson, 2008). Wang et al (2014) found that the 
vehicle internal communication network, Controller 
Area Network (CAN), does not provide message 
authentication mechanism. This vulnerability makes 
possible to control ECUs via On Board Diagnostics 
(OBD) interface. In practice, the attacker could control 
ECUs via USB or Bluetooth enabled OBD-adapter. 
Checkoway et al., (2011) raises even more potential 
vulnerabilities. They state that embedded CD-drive, 
internal Wi-Fi, embedded Bluetooth, smart phone 
integration possibilities, remote keyless entry and Tire 
Pressure Management System (TPMS) could open 
doors for attackers. 
There is no comprehensive list for vehicle features 
related safeguards available, we can make some 
recommendations. We recommend protecting OBD 
service interface in a way there is no possibility to 
install devices for unauthorized access. We also 
recommend disabling Bluetooth, avoid using smart 
phone integration and following latest research results 
to get up to date information about car related 
information and cyber security vulnerabilities. 
5.3 Vehicle Equipment 
Police officers, firefighters, public safety officers and 
other personnel of emergency response carry various 
types of equipment in their vehicles (Rathod and 
Kämppi, 2013). Some of them are use specific like 
speed radars, explosion meters, carbon meters and 
thermal cameras. There are also many commercial 
devices used in the ERV. We can name navigators, 
cellular phones, voice recorders, printers and USB-
sticks. As a summary, the list of the used equipment 
can be long and heterogeneous. 
Before installing any new equipment in the ERV 
it should be ensured that installation process follows 
company policies, new device meets specified 
technical requirements and security controls are 
protective enough without having negative effect for 
usability. New devices should have possibility for 
mass memory protection and the mass memory 
should be removed or erased if the device is sent for 
maintenance. Printers require memory encryption 
features. All unused Bluetooth- and WLAN-
connections are disabled if they are not used and 
secured. As a basic principle, there must be verified 
that new devices do not create any new information 
and cyber security risks. When the new device is 
installed, the device hardware and software 
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 information need to be updated to vehicle specific 
register. Updated register makes possible to schedule 
needed software updates in conjunction with vehicle 
maintenance program. 
5.4 Interior Space and Cabin Design 
The design principles for interior space and cabin has 
important role in everyday activities. Design 
principles focus on the interior design and build of the 
vehicle, considering the optimum use of available 
space, ergonomics, safety, material consumption and 
easy maintenance.  
TIn information and cyber security point of view, 
we could concentrate on data confidentially and 
availability. Interior space should offer lockable 
storage space for confidential material. For data 
availability, there should be available suitable space 
for ICT-systems and cable routings. 
5.5 ICT Systems 
The MOBI project introduced an approach where 
ERV is equipped with rugged on-board computer 
with Windows OS, touch screen displays, keyboard, 
mouse and printer.   This approach is very flexible and 
it enables users to access their software applications 
including office, email, diary, and reporting. 
Additionally, there could be included portable 
devices like laptops and tablets. Figure 4 describes 
typical ICT-system setup in the ERV. 
KATAKRI offers very comprehensive set of 
safeguards that can be implemented in on-board 
computer. The most important safeguard is properly 
configured host based firewall and malware 
protection application. KATAKRI defines that only 
predefined traffic is allowed and denied traffic is 
logged. There should be also a clear policy for 
firewall configuration, documentation and frequent 
rule base review. Operating system needs to be 
hardened; only needed services are activated, 
applications have minimal number of user rights, 
mass memory is encrypted, default passwords are 
changed and all unnecessary physical interfaces are 
disabled. And finally, all detected security breaches 
need to be logged. 
5.6 Data Communications 
A mobile office requires data communication channel 
that can guarantee data transmission confidentially, 
integrity and availability. The most economical way 
is to use commercial mobile networks due the fact 
that dedicated authority networks are optimized for 
voice communications (Boris and Wood, 2013). 
Anyhow, commercial networks are not optimized for 
availability in critical communications point of view. 
The availability requirements can be fulfilled by 
special devices, multi-channel routers, which are able 
to combine several data bearers as a single transparent 
data bearer. The multi-channel router offers local data 
connectivity for end users via both wired and wireless 
Wi-Fi connections.  
The most important safeguards for external data 
communications is support for strong data encryption 
and possibility to use redundant connections. Secret 
keys for encryption are used only by authorized users. 
The session management should meet requirements; 
re-activation of closed session is prevented; inactive 
sessions are terminated and the length of the session 
has certain time limit. And finally, routing messages 
are verified and filtered. If the data connection is 
shared locally for the end users by Wi-Fi, the 
connection should be protected according best 
practices. The Service Set Identifier (SSID) needs to 
be hidden, users are authenticated and the connection 
is encrypted by IEEE 802.11i (WPA2) and the system 
uses private IP-addresses for the local 
communication. 
5.7 Voice Communications 
Voice communication systems include dispatching 
systems, telephone systems, public reporting systems, 
and radio systems (Welch et al., 2013). Voice 
communication systems provide the following 
functions: communication between the public and 
emergency response agencies, communication within 
the emergency response agency under given 
conditions and communication among emergency 
response agencies (Boris and Wood, 2013).  
The most used technologies for voice 
communications are Terrestrial Trunked Radio 
(TETRA), TETRAPOL and Project 25 (P25). The 
technologies are designed to meet high security and 
availability requirements for critical voice 
communications. Anyhow, we can present a few 
safeguards for handheld terminals. The terminals 
should be protected by password if feasible and all 
additional connection types like Bluetooth and Wi-Fi 
should be disabled if they are not needed. Mass 
memory is encrypted and the system should support 
terminal remote management (locking and erasing). 
5.8 Power Supply System 
The power supply system acts very important role in 
any modern vehicle. In case of ERV the situation is 
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 more critical. ERVs are loaded with additional 
equipment that requires extra power to guarantee 
maximum availability. 
The situation could be solved by installing two 
separate batteries in ERV; one battery for vehicle 
infrastructure and one battery for additional 
equipment. The battery system should be designed 
properly and it should have enough capacity for 
standby missions, possibility for external charging 
and it should have real time indication for low 
charging level (Kämppi and Rathod, 2013). 
Researchers have worked on finding a holistic 
solution and finally using NFPA 110 where power 
systems include “power sources, transfer equipment, 
controls, supervisory equipment, and all related 
electrical and mechanical auxiliary and accessory 
equipment needed to supply electrical power to the 
load terminals of the transfer equipment” (NFPA, 
2016). Researchers also suggested using alternative 
power systems during failures of the main power 
systems, for example Emergency Power Supply 
System (EPSS). In electric vehicles, the integrated 
on-board batteries could solve power supply related 
problems. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presented and discussed, the modern 
emergency vehicle is a very complicated combination 
of different technologies and assembly. The relevant 
standardization is focused to cover safety, 
performance and testing issues. Information and 
cyber security is still uncovered although ERVs has 
been equipped with additional equipment during 
many years. 
In this study, we made a feasibility study how 
KATAKRI audit criteria could be applied with van 
sized ERVs that are equipped with additional devices 
and ICT-technologies. We found that KATAKRI 
does provides large set of safeguards if we are 
protecting legacy systems or on-the-self products; 
commercial hardware and standard operating 
systems. We also discovered that maintenance of the 
additional technology, including hardware and 
software, should be integrated as a part of vehicle 
maintenance program. Continuous maintenance is the 
key issue for maintaining reached level of 
information and cyber security. 
It is obvious that the traditional information and 
cyber security standards and frameworks, like 
KATAKRI, are not able to cover unidentified or 
unknown information and cyber security risks of 
modern vehicle platforms. Traditional information 
and cyber security standards and frameworks can be 
used as guidelines but there is needed a lot of research 
work to recognize vehicle platform related 
information and cyber security risks. 
Anyhow, the proposed model is vehicle platform 
and technology independent solution. It can be 
applied for any type of vehicle including van, sedan, 
truck, hybrid or electric vehicles as long as the vehicle 
platform is integrated with additional legacy 
hardware and software. Secondly, the proposed 
model is extendable and it can be complemented with 
more comprehensive risk analysis procedure if there 
is any deeper integration with vehicle platform 
computing systems. The future research work should 
concentrate for covering ERV as one protectable asset 
including vehicle platform and additional equipment 
and software as a whole. 
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